On the other hand, in October 1961 one S. Hasan Ali Shah Kazimi quoted fatws from both Grand Ayatollahs which seemed to contradict: Borujerdi had considered it more safe (ahwat) to use even the sahm-i imm for the poor sayyids if their part of the khums was not sufficient. Literally: singers of odes, i.e. Since 1951 he taught at the Madrasat Qsim ul-Ulm in Multan where he became head instructor and Shaikh ul-Hadth. On the evening of 1 November 1968, the following official statement was released, which also appeared in all daily newspapers the next morning: With the approval of the Central Government, the Government of West Pakistan has decided to revise the syllabi of Islamiat in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Board of Shia and Sunni Ulema which was set up by the Central Government some time ago. His stay closed with a large public gathering at Karbal-i Gme Shh.170Close At a press conference on 29 February, S. Muhammad Dihlavi gave a comprehensive account of the three demands and their implications (excerpts): After the foundation of Pakistan the Muslims had merely understood that their goal had been achieved and they would be free to do what they liked. On Dhakko see Naqvi, Tazkira, pp. 39). In schools and colleges our children are given such a form of religious instruction that they do not understand their own mazhab at all. Since many ulam had made great efforts to induce the Shias to pay their religious dues while at the same time denouncing wasteful spending for majlis and mahfil, including the fees for preachers paid at such occasions, the latter were bound to counterattack sooner or later. List of Shia Muslims With the Shia-Sunni problem on the backburner and public munzart banned since the imposition of martial law, the combative Maulana was apparently eager to open up a new front. [Their] leadership of the qaum: abolished; representing the qaum: nonexistent; progress of religious knowledge: finished; work for reform and organisation together with preaching: zero; [they are] staying away from efforts for the Shia demands. Instead, the inconvenience caused for local Sunnis by the lengthy azdr processions through the narrow lanes of the Old City was highlighted in some detail.119Close Apparently more important than the identity of the instigators of sectarian violence were questions as to whether security precautions taken by the local administration had been sufficient, and whether the comportment of the police was adequate after rioting had started.120Close, The report closed with ten recommendations from the chairman of the Inquiry Committee which had been accepted in principle by the government: 1) the establishment of a reconciliation committee; 2) no new licences for processions and cancelling of licences for those who had not abided to the conditions; 3) no change of traditional procession routes except in case of dangers for security or in amicable agreement with the organisers; 4) additional conditions regarding security of the processions for licence-holders; 5) if possible, the duration of the main zljinnh procession should be reduced; and there should be no mtam in front of mosques at the time of prayers or azn; 6) severe punishment for disrespectful references to the leaders of another sect; 7) a ban on carrying arms in Muharram; 8) private volunteers should not be employed on traffic duty or other duties normally performed by the police; 9) punishment for the spreading of rumours; 10) strengthening of the Lahore police force.121Close, As it turned out, no culprits of the 1963 sectarian violence were ever punished, whether in Lahore or in Theri.122Close The basic dilemma of any government in Pakistan, namely the need not to be perceived as biased in favour of the Shia minority, led to relative laxity towards Sunni extremists during the second half of the Ayub Khan era, despite the events of 1963.